





Trust and reciprocity are the bond of society (John Locke) and the 
lubricant of soci-economic systems (Arrow). Economic agents are 
conceived as both self-interested and intrinsically untrustworthy. 
These assumptions impair severely economists’ accounts of social 
relationships. The paper examines strategies to escape this 
paradox by enlarging our conception of rationality: the 
assumptions of self-interest and consequentialism are critically 
discussed as well as relational behavioral principles (e.g. trust 
and reciprocity). The paper analyses the working of two different 
kinds of incentive mechanisms, namely intra-personal and inter-
personal, and discusses experimental evidence that emphasize the 
empirical relevance of the latter. Such mechanisms have 
important normative implications. In this respect some of the 
conditions that affect the process of accumulation and erosion of 
trust and social capital are explored. The tension between rules 
and trust turns out to be not inescapable, though it calls for a 
changing in the designing logic of institutions and contracts. I 
shall discuss what are the changes needed in order to implement 
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 21.  Introduction* 
 
Trust and reciprocity are the “bond of society” (Locke), but 
economic agents are usually assumed to be both self-interested 
and intrinsically untrustworthy. That has strong impact on the 
understanding that economics shows about the working 
interpersonal relationships. According to Robert Gibbons, for 
instance - “One simple possibility – of this way of theorising about 
homo economicus - is that economic models that ignore social 
psychology are incomplete descriptions of incentives in 
organizations. A more troubling possibility is that management 
practices based on economic models may dampen (or even destroy) 
non-economic realities such as intrinsic motivations and social 
relations” (1998, p. 130). In much the same vein studies on social 
dilemmas, happiness and economics and social interactions (see 
Bruni & Porta, 2005; Gui & Sugden, 2005), all point out that the 
standard concept of economic rationality is inadequate to account 
for these and phenomena and it has to be amended in order to 
incorporate relational factors such as trust, reciprocity, intentions 
and social emotions. In this paper I discuss some research 
strategies that point in this direction by questioning the 
assumptions of self-interest, consequentialism and opportunism.  
Game theory and agency theory are at the core of this 
research line that emphasizes the crucial role of incentives and of 
how incentives provision systems should be designed in order to 
foster efficiency.  
Economic models are based on the assumption that agents 
are individual utility maximizers, that is, actuated by the desire 
to achieve the preferred among the outcomes their actions could 
lead to. A corollary of this assumption is that material rewards 
play a dominant role in shaping agent’s preference orderings 
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 3However, in the last decade a growing body of theoretical 
paradoxes and empirical evidence have begun to be accumulated 
that cast doubts about the descriptive accuracy of this model. 
These limitations call for an enlarged version of rationality, where 
the maximization of material utility is no longer the only motive 
to action, and agents are described as non-pure-consequentialists. 
 Here I shall explore ways to complete that picture of human 
agency focusing, as Gibbons suggests in the opening quotation, on 
the role of intrinsic motivations and social relations.  
Having discussed, the basic tenets of the classical agency 
theory (2), the paper analyses the working of two different kinds 
of incentive mechanisms, namely intra-personal (3) and inter-
personal and discusses experimental results that emphasize the 
empirical relevance of the latter (4). A theoretical framework 
based on social approval, reciprocity and trust  is provided, that 
accounts for the empirical evidence discussed earlier (5). These 
elements have important normative implications. In this respect 
some of the conditions that affect the process of accumulation and 
erosion of trust and social capital are explored (6). Conclusions 
close the paper (7).  
 
 
2.  The basic assumptions of agency theory. 
 
Agency theory assumes two kinds of subjects, the principal 
and the agent. Principals have some interest that cannot be 
pursued without the participation of the agent(s). The 
participation in the interest of the principal is a source of 
disutility for the agents. Thus, the agency problem reduces to find 
a way to make the agent “incapsulate” principal’s interests. Two 
main facts characterize the principal-agent relationship so 
described: first, their interests are conflicting and second, agent’s 
actions or characteristics are only imperfectly observable by the 
principal. Consider for simplicity a relation between employer and 
employee. The employer aims at maximizing profits which 
positively depend on the employee’s effort. The employee is effort–
adverse and the level of effort actually performed cannot be 
directly observed by the principal. A wage, which constitutes a 
cost for the employer and a source of utility for the employee, has 
to be provided to the employee to persuade her to carry out some 
level of effort. In this sense, an incentive provision system (as 
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the conflicting objectives of employer and employee. The wage 
provided by the employer must satisfy two requirements: from the 
employer’s viewpoint, it has to be at least as higher as her 
reservation utility (participation constraint); and, given that, the 
employee’s effort will maximize her net utility. This classical 
theory is grounded on three main assumptions:  
1) Monotonicity: the higher the wage, the higher the effort 
exerted;  
2) Consequentialism: people are interested only in the outcomes 
their actions lead to; 
3) Opportunism: given the asymmetry in the informational 
structure, whenever it will be possible, the agent will behave 
opportunistically. 
 
Most of the recent developments in agency theory1 aim at 
finding optimal compensation schemes capable to reduce the risk 
of opportunism while contextually making the contract enough 
attractive to be accepted by the agent. Notwithstanding the lively 
debate ongoing in this area, the three assumptions above 
mentioned have remained mostly unchallenged.  
In what follows I shall discuss some phenomena that are at 
odds with those assumptions. In particular, in the next section I 
shall describe patterns of behavior that disconfirm the positive 
relationship between material incentives and performance, 
asserted by the assumption 1), that refute the consequentialist 
orientation of the classical agency theory, as described by 
assumption 2) and that will shed light upon the far too simplistic 
nature of assumption 3).          
 
 
3.  Extrinsic and intrinsic incentives: Intra-
personal mechanisms. 
 
Economic profession maintains that assumption 1) is a 
general law of human behavior. So general and well established 
that it has gained almost the status of an axiom. While, on the 
one hand, it is true that the assumption has received some degree 
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 5of empirical validation, on the other hand, such a support can be 
variously interpreted. Firstly, it has to be noticed that the 
correlation between pay and productivity, which is the main 
empirical finding, may have a twofold explanation: the more you 
pay a subject, the more she will perform, as the assumption 
maintains, or the more you offer for a job, the higher the 
probability to attract skilled workers with higher productivity. 
Thus, the observed correlation may be explained both by a 
“incentive matter-argument” and a “selection-argument”. Below I 
shall present examples that directly address these two 
arguments. Let consider first the latter.  
 
The “selection-argument” entails that high monetary 
rewards are able to attract subjects better suited for that task. 
Consider the following examples. In a seminal study on gift-giving, 
sociologist Richard Titmuss (1970), found that, despite its voluntary 
basis, the blood donation system adopted in England was more 
efficient (in terms of volume, quality and temporal availability of 
blood received), when compared with the remunerated system used 
in the United States, in those years. Paying for giving blood leads to 
a reduced quality and quantity of blood supply. Trying to increase 
the supply of blood, Americans allowed blood banks to pay donors 
for the blood they gave. However, contrary to what they would have 
expected, the result turned out to be worse along all the dimensions, 
if compared to the donor system.  
 
Titmuss’ explanation is based on the different kinds of 
motivations that may underlie the same action (blood donation). 
In the case of the voluntary donor, in fact, the motive is altruistic 
and other-regarding, grounded on intrinsic reasons; while in the 
case of the remunerated donor, the motive is materially self-
interested, grounded on extrinsic motivations. According to 
Titmuss, the introduction of monetary incentives lead to a self-
selection of potential donors, attracting those more interested in 
the material reward. This people is subject to a stronger 
temptation of opportunism, of being, for instance, less truthful 
about the risk of serum hepatitis. At the same time, the intrinsic 
motivated donors were displaced by the introduction of a 
monetary reward. Consistently with a sort of “Gresham’s Law of 
human motivations” such a self-selection strongly affected the 
quality of the blood actually given. 
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managers subject to two different regimes of monitoring are 
compared. Group A is left with a large degree of discretion, while 
group B is strictly monitored. The underlying idea is that as the 
monitoring become more stringent it will be easier to observe each 
agents’ effort and reward it accordingly. That strict correlation 
between effort and reward should induce an increase in the level of 
effort itself. However, Barkema reports a puzzling result as, in fact, 
the performance of group B,   the one more strictly monitored, is 
poorer than that of Group A, which is not monitored.  
 
A third example highlights the same counterproductive effect. 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) run an experiment using parents who 
have their children in a kindergarten. They analyzed during 20 
weeks how people reacted to the introduction of a fine for those 
parents who were late at picking their children. The fine was 
intended, by imposing an additional cost to dysfunctional behavior, 
to reduce the number of latecomer parents. At the end of the 20 
weeks, however, Gneezy and Rustichini observed an increase in the 
number of latecomer right in the group subject to the fine. And yet, 
this number remained stable even after the fine was removed.  
 
A potential explanation that may account for all these 
phenomena refers to the so-called “motivational crowding-out 
theory” (Frey, 1997; Frey – Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). In certain 
cases the subjects’ willingness to perform a given action is 
decreased (instead of increased, as the theory would suggest) by 
the prospect of a monetary or material reward. The motivational 
crowding-out theory assumes that the same person may have both 
extrinsic and intrinsic reasons, and that when one tries to 
incentive, through extrinsic rewards, certain classes of actions 
ruled by intrinsic motivations, the underlying motivation is 
transformed, from intrinsic to extrinsic, and the overall result 
may turn out to be a decrease in the agent’ willingness to perform 
those actions.  
 
While Titmuss stresses the risk of adverse selection associated 
to the provision of material incentives, the other two examples show 
how the introduction of a monetary reward may discourage the 
same person to perform the very action the incentive was intended 
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among them, particularly relevant are those concerning subject’s 
self-determination and self-esteem (Frey, 1997, ch. I). Crowding-out 
occurs when - “An intrinsically motivated person is denied the 
chance to display his or her own interest and involvement in an 
activity, when someone else offers a reward” (p.47). Also the way 
the subject perceives the external intervention plays a crucial role 
in determining the crowding-out or crowding-in effect. In fact, such 
an intervention can be seen either as controlling or as supporting, 
subjects’ behavior. In the latter case, we observe a strengthening of 
subjects’ other-regarding attitudes (crowding-in), in the former case, 
because of the impaired self-determination and self-esteem, we 
observe its weakening (crowding-out).  
 
Motivational crowding-out theory accounts for the hidden cost 
of rewards in term of self-esteem and supportive or controlling 
interventions; however this explanatory strategy cannot account for 
another class of behavioral anomalies that relates to assumption 2) 
and that refers to the relational aspects of the agents’ motivational 
structure. In the following section I shall discuss some examples of 
such anomalous behavior and I will try to provide some elements 
for a unifying framework with which both classes of violations could 
be accommodated. 
   
 
4.  Consequentialist or intentional rationality?  
 
The examples I have been discussing so far show how 
material incentives may be ineffective in achieving their aim 
because of the often neglected, complex interplay of intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations. However, considering different sources of 
personal motivation is just the first step towards a more 
descriptively accurate picture of economic agency. A next step, in 
fact, should include those sources of motivations that originate 
within an interpersonal relationship, which are relational. 
Jack Hirshleifer claimed years ago that - “perhaps the grossest 
flaw in the economist’s traditional view of human being is 
illustrated by the attention we devote to his man-thing activities 
as opposed to man-man activities (…) Economist have been 
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 8studying only a chapter of the book of economic life” (1978, p. 
336). Here I shall discuss examples that stress the inadequacy of 
such a one-sided view of economic interaction, in particular I shall 
focus on the limitations of a consequentialist model of agency that 
assumes agents who are exclusively interested in the outcomes 
their actions lead to.  According this view, Players order their 
preferences over actions according to their preferences over the 
consequences these actions lead to. If action a produces outcome 
α, action b produces outcome β and action c yields to outcome γ, 
action  a  is preferred to b  and  to c, as long as outcome α is 
preferred to β  and the latter to γ.  Experimental evidence, 
however, show that the same outcome may be variously assessed 
depending on the history of play that lead to it. That means that 
when deciding how to behave in a strategic situation, real people 
take into account not only the prospective outcomes of their joint 
actions but also other backward looking elements.  
Consider the games G1 and G2 depicted in figure 1 and 2 (Falk et 
al., 1998). Player A makes an offer to B of either 2 or 5 in G1, or 2 
or 8 in G2, player B can either accept or reject A's offer. If she 
accepts, the division is implemented and the players are paid 
accordingly, if she refuses to accept, both players get nothing.  
Given that players are assumed to be self-interested, rational 
maximizers and consequentialist, the theory predicts first, that As 
would offer the smallest amount of money, and second, that B 
would not reject any positive offer. Given that the outcomes 
conditional to As choosing "H" are identical in G1 and G2, we 
should observe in both situations the same, or a very similar rate 
of refusal. However, when real people play the games we observe, 
first, that Bs reject As’ offers more often than would have been 
"rational"; second, and more interestingly, that the number of 
refusals is higher in G1 (44%) than in G2 (18%). That result is 
surprising because, once A proposes 2 to B, from B’s perspective 
the two games are identical, at least in term of outcomes, payoff 
distribution and consequences.   
 
 
Figure 1: “G1 - Reduced Ultimatum Game” 
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Figure 2: “G2 - Reduced Best-Shot Game” 
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A similar result is reported in Pelligra (2003), where respondents’ 
behaviour in a “gratuitous investment game” is compared to that 
of the proposers in a “dictator game”.  The data show that, despite 
from the respondents’ viewpoint (in the investment game) and 
from the  proposers’ viewpoint (in the dictator game), the two 
games are identical in terms of the consequences they lead to, in 
the investment game the respondents sends back on average 11 
Euros, while in the dictator game the average offer is of only 5 
Euros. 
  In their 2002 experiment, Fehr and List observe the behavior 
of a sample of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs ) in various forms of 
investment games. In particular they considered two variants of 
the game, one where the first player is endowed with a certain 
amount of money and has to decide which part of the endowment, 
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tripled and given to player 2, who can, in turn, decide how much, 
if any, to send back. The second variant of the game is similar 
apart from the fact that a sanction can be implemented by player 
1, if what she receives back from player 2 is less that what she 
had expected. The game theoretical solution to both games is for 
player 1 to send nothing to player 2, and for player 2 to send back 
nothing to player 1. However, what has been observed is not only 
that most of the experimental subjects decided to invest and to 
send back substantial amounts of money but, most  strikingly, 
that such amount increases in the treatment when the sanctions 
are available even if, actually, not used. This result is interpreted 
by Fehr and List as a sign that: “the availability  of the 
sanctioning threat can be quite productive (…) If principals 
voluntarily refrain from using the punishment threat when it is 
available, agents exhibit significantly more trustworthiness than 
if the punishment threat is not available. Thus if agents face no 
punishment threat, the mere fact the principal could have used 
the punishment option affects the agent’s trustworthiness in a 
positive manner” (2002, p.2).    
  All these situations, although theoretically equivalent in term 
of outcomes, are different if we consider the history of the play, in 
particular with respect, not only to what each player did but also 
to what they could have done and did not. What emerges is that 
for real people bygones are relevant as well are the choices 
actually made. Other studies (Blount, 1995; Charness, 1998; 
Nelson, 2002; Charness & Levine, 2005) have highlighted similar 
patterns of anomalous behaviour.  
These results emphasize two crucial points: first, people are 
more trustful and trustworthy that predicted by the theory, and 
second, people do not care only about consequences, but also about 
others’ intentions. Intentions can be inferred by observing the 
chosen strategy not in isolation but within the entire strategy set; 
this gives to the agent the possibility to figure out what the 
opponent could have done and did not.  
  
 
5.  Reciprocity and trust as relational incentives: 
inter-personal mechanisms. 
 
 11The evidence I have been presenting so far should have 
made clear how retaining assumption 1 and 2 means, somehow, to 
reduce the descriptive and explanatory power of agency theory. 
Moreover, from the critique of assumption 2 it follows that 
opportunistic behavior is not as pervasive as assumption 3 seems 
to suggest. Actual behavior, in fact, depends on the particular 
structure of the interaction players are placed in and on the 
behavior of all the relevant players. What the data suggest is that 
a more satisfactory version of agency theory should incorporate a 
behavioral explanation of how incentives work and a more 
realistic model of the relational dynamics of the economic agent. 
In this section I shall discuss two of the principles that may help 
in developing the relational part of the theory, namely, reciprocity 
and trust. These two concepts and their effects are tightly 
intertwined and quite often confused. In most theoretical and 
experimental studies trust is considered as an expectation of a 
reciprocal behavior. However, the relation between two concepts, 
although very close, is richer and more subtle than that. Not 
always trust can be considered as an expectation of reciprocity 
since there are instances of trusting interactions where 
trustworthy behavior seems not to be motivated by reciprocity (i.e. 
the “gratuitous” trust game in Pelligra, 2005). Therefore trust and 
reciprocity should be kept conceptually separated.  
The bargaining experiments I have been discussing highlight 
that real people tend to behave kindly to those who have been 
kind to them and unkindly with who has been unkind. Those 
behaviors respond to the norm of (positive and negative) 
reciprocity. It has been shown both empirically (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 2002) and theoretically (Rabin, 
1993) how, in certain conditions, such a norm may offset the effect 
of the material payoffs in the strategic decision making. The effect 
of reciprocity may lead the subject to act in a way that appears to 
be contrary to her material self-interest. The idea of reciprocity is 
ultimately based on the joint effects of material and psychological 
incentives. That means that the motivation that triggers (positive 
or negative) reciprocal behavior is ultimately based on material 
incentives. The perceived kindness that elicits reciprocal 
behavior, is a measure of material benefit that an agent's choice 
attributes to another player. Another behavioral principle is 
consistent with that evidence and is also able to explain 
behaviours that are at odds with the norm of reciprocity, namely 
trust responsiveness (Bacharach, Guerra, Zizzo, 2002; Pelligra, 
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meaning refers to the fact that an explicit act of trust has the 
peculiarity of “inducing” or “eliciting”, to some degree, a 
trustworthy response. In this respect is said that trust is 
responsive or self-fulfilling. Suppose we have two agents, A and B. 
According to the “responsive trust” conception, B’s 
trustworthiness may be induced by A’s choosing a trustful course 
of action (like, for instance, player 1 sending money to player 2 in 
an investment game, or offering an above-the-minimum wage in 
the gift exchange game). This kind of inducement assumes the 
existence of a psychological mechanism according to which, A’s 
trustful action, motivates B to reward such trustfulness, making 
him behave trustworthily, even though such a behavior implies 
some material cost. I call such a psychological mechanism “trust 
responsiveness”.  
  It is important to notice that, since the logic of trust 
responsiveness is symmetrical, that is, an act of trust elicits 
trustworthiness as well as an act of distrust elicits opportunism, 
trust responsiveness may synthetically subsume the crowding-out 
effect.  
  In the case of crowding-out effect, a conflict arises between 
internal and external reasons for agents’ action. Consider a worker 
that performs poorly when monitored. She will disappoint her 
principal but, at the same time, she will react, on the basis of her 
sense of worth and self-esteem, to an act of hostility by her 
employer (a distrustful monitoring). While crowding motivation 
theory explains different behaviors assuming the existence of two 
different types of motives for action (intrinsic and extrinsic), trust 
responsiveness suggests that the different effects of (dis)incentives 
depends on the relative weight of the associated, material, social 
and psychological consequences (Pelligra, 2005). 
  
  While the motivational crowding-out, although non–standard 
in agency theory, can easily be incorporated in a classical rational 
choice model (Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, 1997), reciprocity and trust, on 
the other hand, imply that players are responsive to other players’ 
behavior, that is, that payoffs are endogenous. Such a characteristic 
makes impossible to reconcile those principles with the standard 
model of game theory which is essentially consequentialist 
(Geneakoplos, Pearce,  Stacchetti, 1989; Rabin, 1993). 
 
 
 136.  Normative and institutional implications. 
 
As Gibbons acutely points out, there exists a possibility that  
– “management practices based on economic models may dampen 
(or even destroy) non-economic realities such as intrinsic 
motivations and social relations” (1998, p. 130). If constitutions, 
institutions, contracts and any other set of rules are based on the 
assumption that real people behave as the so-called homo 
economicus who obeys to assumptions 1, 2 and 3 of agency theory, 
there may emerge counterproductive effects. That is the main 
reason behind the normative implications that an enlarged 
picture of economic agents produces for institutional design and 
policy. Depending on the anthropological model they embody, in 
fact, those activities may promote or obstacle a process of 
diffusion of pro-social behaviours and consequently of social 
capital.  
If people draw psychological utility from self-esteem, social 
approval, reciprocal behavior and trustworthiness, those elements 
should be incorporated in the incentive systems and managed as 
important resources. To avoid conflicts between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations, material rewards have to be carefully 
engineered to convey a sense of support instead of a sense of 
control that may backfire, reducing subjects’ own willingness to 
perform the same action the incentives were supposed to favor.  
  Moreover, being reciprocity and trust motivational active 
elements, interaction schemes should be created within the 
communities capable to activate those elements also because, as 
James Coleman argued, when someone ask another to be 
trustworthy – “he does so because it brings him a needed benefit; 
he does not consider that it does the other a benefit as well by 
adding to a drawing found of social capital available in time of 
need” (1998, p.S117). A too strict, mistrustful  monitoring, 
reducing the room for socially approved intrinsic trustworthiness, 
goes in the opposite direction and may increase opportunism and 
shirking, instead of reducing it, as Barkema’s experiment clearly 
shows. To lay down even the most specific details of a contract 
may subtract space for reciprocal actions and may lead to pareto-
inferior outcomes. Trust is a matter of signals. The trustee must 
know that the trustor is relying upon her. Is this signal that 
motivates the trustor to perform trustworthily. If the trustor 
hadn’t trusted the trustee and signaled that to her, perhaps she 
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leave room for this sort of signal.   
  Reciprocity and trust are norms enforced also by social 
(dis)approval. As Fehr and Falk (2002) have recently noticed, such 
norms are likely to produce strategic complementarity among 
agents’ actions. That means that the efficacy of the social 
approval motive depends on others’ people behavior. If others are 
sensitive to approval and disapproval from their peers, each 
agent’s action will find in the desire for others’ praise a strong 
psychological incentive, otherwise, the material reward will 
always be predominant. That opens the possibility for Pareto-
rankable multiple equilibria to emerge. The transition from an 
inefficient equilibrium to a more efficient one would depend, then, 
on how social incentives work within the community. An 
“atmosphere” can be then created where the desire for others’ 
praise may be encouraged and that may ultimately favor agents’ 
praiseworthiness or at least agents’ desire for social praise.        
  As Matthew Rabin clearly put it: “Economics should be 
concerned not only with the efficient allocation of material goods, 
but also with designing institutions such that people are happy 
about the way they interact with others” (1993, p. 1283). Precisely 
in this sense, agents’ intrinsic motivations should be considered 
as economic realities, as well as their desire for material reward. 
A careful design is needed to avoid the risk of stimulating a clash 
between the two kinds of motivations.  
  Intrinsic motivations, trust and reciprocity may be thought 
of as important, sometime, crucial, assets of each community. 
Neglecting this point  would produce counterproductive effects 
with consequent waste of resources and harm for the community’s 
efficiency. 
 
The activity of institutional design aims, on the one hand, at 
regulating people’s interactions at different levels, by creating 
formal institutions capable to coordinate agents’ interests and to 
direct them towards the desired outcome and, on the other hand, 
at sustaining and promote with sanctions and other forms of 
(dis)incentives certain classes of behaviors.  
Institutional design is traditionally based on an 
anthropological model that is very similar to that of the homo 
economicus (Goodin, 1996). According to this view, since the harm 
associated to a violation of the norm is bigger than the benefit 
deriving from compliance, rules must be created assuming that 
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opportunistic and self-interested. In Hume’s own words: “Fixing 
the several check and controls of the constitution, every man 
ought to be supposed a knave, and to have any other end in all his 
actions that private interest” (1875: 117-8). This designing 
philosophy has been defined as deviant-centered (Pettit, 1996) and 
is ultimately based on the very same assumptions of the agency 
theory I have critically discussed above. The basic idea is that of 
creating more deterrence than is necessary for most people, in 
order to make sure that it would be sufficient for all. However, as 
we have already noticed, this exercise is not neutral, as, in fact, it 
tends to erode most of people’s intrinsic motivations and 
interpersonal trust. The theoretical descriptive inadequacy of the 
standard assumptions, thus, may lead to devise systems of rules 
that practically discourage compliance. 
  The drawbacks of the deviant-centered  system call for an 
alternative designing approach to be developed. An approach 
where the focus is on how to foster compliance more than how to 
discourage deviance. This approach can be thus defined as 
complier-centered. Within this approach, all the motivational 
sources, intrinsic and extrinsic, are taken into account and 
carefully managed to avoid conflicts, and the relational incentives 
are used to foster compliance while at the same time discouraging 
opportunism. 
  At the core of the complier-centered systems three general 
principles stand: 
i)  first, before providing (dis)incentives is important to select 
the pool of individuals that will be subject to those 
(dis)incentives;  
ii)  second, the (dis)incentives aims principally to favor 
cooperative behaviors than to punish the opportunistic ones.  
iii)  third, (dis)incentives must not neglect the risk of 
opportunism.  
 
The  complier-centered systems as well as the deviant-
centered   one, have at their center what seems to be an 
inescapable dilemma: how to discourage knaves if any sanction 
can erode the willingness to comply of intrinsic motivated people? 
A way out of the dilemma could be represented by what Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992) define “dynamic regulatory institutions”. 
These institutions embody systems of rules primarily based on the 
power of dialogue and persuasion more than deterrence. Rules 
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sanctions have informal nature and are associated to minor 
violations; they are neutral, in the sense that do not erode 
intrinsic motivations. Higher level sanctions are formal and are 
associated only to repeated violations; these sanctions are more 
concerned with minimizing harm that safeguard intrinsic 
motivation. This system is organized as a pyramid: at the basis 
(large and diffuse) there is dialogue and persuasion based on 
trust, in the middle, deterrence based on calculativeness and on 
top (small and rare), incapacitation aimed at reducing the harm 
caused by the incompetent and untrustworthy agents.. 
  Here I cannot go further in analyzing these principles, I have 
done it diffusely elsewhere (Pelligra, 2002b), but, by now, the 
message should be clear enough. The different typologies of 
interpersonal relationships through which communities activates 
their resources should be accurately structured in order not to 
provoke crowding-out effects, and, more generally, trust and 
social capital erosion. Work relations, public administration, 
consumers and the civil society at large are all environments 
where this recommendation applies.  
 
 
7.  Conclusions.  
 
In this paper I have critically discussed and challenged the 
three main assumptions of agency theory, respectively, that the 
higher the wage the higher the effort exerted, that people are 
interested only in the outcomes their actions lead to and that, 
given the asymmetry in the information structure, whenever 
possible the agent will behave opportunistically. According to this 
standard view the agent are to be considered “self-interest-seeker 
with guile”, to use Williamson’s expression (1985). 
Our alternative position maintains that: 
 
1)  because of the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motives, it may well be possible that the use of material 
rewards to incentive intrinsically motivated activities, turns 
out to reduce the performance of such activities 
(motivational crowding-out);  
 
 172)  people are responsive to others’ behavior, therefore the same 
outcome may be differently evaluated depending on the 
strategies that lead to it; 
 
3)  for this reason people tend to behave opportunistically much 
less than the classical theory would suggest.  Trust and 
reciprocity are principles that account for the observed 
anomalous behaviors. 
 
4)  the tension between rules and trust (deviant-centered 
systems vs. complier-centered systems) turns out not to be 
inescapable, though it calls for a changing in the designing 
logic of relational structures. 
 
Those points have important implications for the activity of 
institutional design. The desire for social approval, trust and 
reciprocity, has to be considered as organizational resource that 
should be carefully engineered to avoid counterproductive effects 
and to improve the overall performance. 
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